semester VI abhidhamma

1. Paṭiccasamuppāda
2. Abhidhamma Classifications (Ultimate Realities: Citta, Cetasika, Rupa, Nibbana)
3. Mental Content (Citta Nimitta)
4. Subjective Experience

1. Paṭiccasamuppāda

1.1. Table of Similes

link	simile
avi -> san	lotus from mud; smoke from fire (cause ≠ nature from effect)
san -> vin	not all vipakas occur to all beings
vin -> nr	fire -> light
nr -> saḷ	development of a coconut
saḷ -> pha
pha -> ved	hand presses fruit bringing juice out
ved -> taṇ
taṇ -> upā	small plant -> grown plant; miner before / after finding diamond
upa -> bha	wood cooks rice indirectly
bha -> jāt	obvious differences in beings; twins
jāt -> jm

1.2. Ultimate Representation

1.2.1. acc. to prmtdī

link	cause	effect
avi -> san	moha in 12 aku	29 aku/ku lokiya cetanās
san -> viñ	" exc. uddhaccasampayutta only pavatti and abhiññā no	32 lokiyavipāka viññāṇa
viñ -> nr	81 lokiyaviññāṇa	nāma: 52 lokiya cetasika; rupa: paṭisandhi kammajarūpa and cittajarūpa
nr -> saḷ	nāma: "; rūpa: 4 mbh, ojā, ji, 6 vatthu	cakkkhu, sota, jivhā, kāya, mano (81 lokiyaviññāṇas)
saḷ -> pha	5 pasāda, 81 citta, 7 gocara, 52 cetasika, 16 sukhumarupa, Nib	phassa cetasika in 81 lokiyacittas
pha -> ved	"	vedanā in 81 lokiyacittas
ved -> taṇ	"	lobha in 8 lmc
taṇ -> upā	"	lobha in 8 lmc, diṭṭhi in 4 dlmc
upā -> bha	"	kamma: cetanā / cittuppāda of 29 ku/aku lokiyacittas; upapatti: 32 lokiyavipākacittas, 35 csk in them, 20 kmkammaja
bha -> jāt	ctn / ctpd of 29 aku/ku lokiyacittas	first arising of upapattibhava; arising of lokiyadhammas in life
jāt -> jm	"	decay of attabhāva, death of attabhāva; ṭhiti and bhaṅga of lokiyadhammas in life
soka	domanassa when 5 byasana
parideva	aniṭṭhasaddārammaṇa when 5 byasana
dukkha	dukkhavedanā in kāyaviññāṇa
domanassa	domanassavedanā in 2 dmc in general
upāyāsa	dosacetasika in 2 dmc when 5 byasana

1.3. Classification (nāmarūpa > khandha > āyatana > dhātu)

nāmarūpa	khandha	āyatana	dhātu
nāma	viññāṇa	manāyatana	Cv, Sv, …Kv
			Mano, Mv
	vedanā	dhammāyatana	dhammadhātu
	saññā	dhammāyatana	dhammadhātu
	saṅkhāra	dhammāyatana	dhammadhātu
rūpa	rūpa	cakkhu…kāya	cakkhu…kāya
		rūpa…phottabba	rūpa…phottabba
		dhammāyatana	dhammadhātu

2. Abhidhamma Classifications (Ultimate Realities: Citta, Cetasika, Rupa, Nibbana)

├── Namarupa (Mental-Physical Phenomena) │ ├── Nama (Mental Factors: Citta + Cetasika) │ │ ├── Vedanā (Feeling) → Khandhas: Vedanā → Ayatanas: Dhammāyatana → Dhatus: Dhammadhātu │ │ ├── Saññā (Perception) → Khandhas: Saññā → Ayatanas: Dhammāyatana → Dhatus: Dhammadhātu │ │ ├── Saṅkhāra (Formations/Volition) → Khandhas: Saṅkhāra → Ayatanas: Dhammāyatana → Dhatus: Dhammadhātu │ │ └── Viññāṇa (Consciousness) → Khandhas: Viññāṇa → Ayatanas: Manāyatana → Dhatus: Cv (Cakkhuviññāṇa), Sv (Sotaviññāṇa), … Kv (Kāyaviññāṇa); Mano (Mind), Mv (Manoviññāṇa) │ └── Rupa (Physical/Form) → Khandhas: Rupa → Ayatanas: Cakkhu…Kāya (Sense Organs) & Rūpa…Phoṭṭabba (Sense Objects); Dhammāyatana (Subtle Rupa/Mental Objects) → Dhatus: Cakkhu…Kāya; Rūpa…Phoṭṭabba; Dhammadhātu ├── Khandhas (5 Aggregates: All Phenomena as Clinging/Suffering) │ ├── Rupa (Form/Matter) │ ├── Vedanā (Feeling/Sensation) │ ├── Saññā (Perception/Recognition) │ ├── Saṅkhāra (Mental Formations/Volitions) │ └── Viññāṇa (Consciousness/Awareness) │ *Overlaps: All khandhas fall under namarupa; analyzed via ayatanas/dhatus for sense-contact processes. ├── Ayatanas (12 Bases: 6 Internal Senses + 6 External Objects – For Arising of Consciousness) │ ├── Internal (Sense Faculties) │ │ ├── Cakkhu (Eye) → Rupa-related │ │ ├── Sota (Ear) → Rupa-related │ │ ├── Ghāna (Nose) → Rupa-related │ │ ├── Jivhā (Tongue) → Rupa-related │ │ ├── Kāya (Body) → Rupa-related │ │ └── Mana (Mind) → Nama-related (Viññāṇa) │ └── External (Sense Objects) │ ├── Rūpa (Visible Forms) → Rupa-related │ ├── Sadda (Sounds) → Rupa-related │ ├── Gandha (Odors) → Rupa-related │ ├── Rasa (Tastes) → Rupa-related │ ├── Phoṭṭabba (Tangibles) → Rupa-related │ └── Dhamma (Mental Objects: Ideas, Subtle Rupa) → Overlaps Nama (Vedanā/Saññā/Saṅkhāra) & some Rupa │ *Overlaps: Dhammāyatana bridges to mental khandhas; all lead to consciousness (viññāṇa) arising. ├── Dhatus (18 Elements: 6 Organs + 6 Objects + 6 Consciousnesses – Detailed Sense Process) │ ├── Sense Organs: Cakkhu, Sota, Ghāna, Jivhā, Kāya, Mano (Mind Base) → Mirrors internal ayatanas │ ├── Sense Objects: Rūpa, Sadda, Gandha, Rasa, Phoṭṭabba, Dhamma → Mirrors external ayatanas │ └── Consciousness Elements: Cakkhuviññāṇa (Eye-Cons.), Sotaviññāṇa (Ear-Cons.), … Kāyaviññāṇa (Body-Cons.), Manoviññāṇa (Mind-Cons.) │ *Overlaps: Dhammadhātu includes mental objects (like dhammāyatana); consciousness dhatus link back to viññāṇa khandha. └── Ariyasaccas (4 Noble Truths: Framework for All Above) ├── Dukkha (Suffering/Truth of Suffering) → Encompasses all khandhas as impermanent/clinging (e.g., namarupa as conditioned) ├── Samudaya (Origin/Craving) → Arises via ayatanas/dhatus (sense contact leading to attachment via saṅkhāra/vedanā) ├── Nirodha (Cessation/Nibbana) → End of khandhas' clinging; transcends namarupa/ayatanas/dhatus └── Magga (Path/Noble Eightfold Path) → Right view/understanding of above classifications to realize truths *Overlaps: The truths analyze the other categories ethically/practically, not as direct sub-classifications.

Key Notes on Overlaps:

Nama/Rupa form the base duality, with khandhas breaking down nama further.
Ayatanas/Dhatus expand on sense processes, overlapping rupa (physical) and nama (mental) elements.
Everything is interconnected via dependent origination (paticcasamuppada), but not shown here for simplicity.

3. Mental Content (Citta Nimitta)

3.1. notes

gahetabbākāra: cittanimitta; aka gayhākāra/gahitākāra

3.2. notes

aspects of cognition
- cittuppāda
- "self-knowing" aspect
- cittanimitta
- ārammaṇa: object of reference
3 main views:
- realism: knowing the object as it is
  - argument aggains: hallucinations, dreams, …
- idealism: no object of reference at all; only citta dna cittanimitta (yogācāra, berkeley a christian priest)
  - argument against: if so, how could we experience conformity of events (things happeing following certain patterns; regularity of experience) (david hume)
  - it exists because we cannot prove the existence of an object without consciousness, though few believe in it
  - type of: only one's consciousness exists; even other's consciousness is mind made
- indirect realism: object exist but is taken by consciousness in certain ways
  - problem: we cannot know if we know the object correctly
  - like a veil between consciousness and object
  - theravada: there is a cetasika called wisdom (maily) which is capable of knowing objects as they are; how do we know that? not really provable by logic
    - epistemology in buddhism
- some say the mind takes pictures: if mental content is pictures, we cannot differentiate the absence of dog / cats; there is somthing more thatn the picture; akasanancayatana: the object is uderstood to have come from such and such thing
- some think we think based on language
even if citta cannot know the obj in its reality, citta can take it as object
cittanimitta is made of saññā: saññaja
ancient comm: paṭibhāganimitta is explained (anapana); it changes acc. to character of the yogi; after reciting a sutta, one monkasked the others how it appeared to them; different similes were given due to the diversity of their perceptions
- :q: is this particular of the anapana?
not produced, but thought, conceived (cittanimitta);
the actual object is the object itself; but in some cases, the nimitta is considered the object
realities have many facets; ekaggatā focuses on one of them; realism is not possible, otherwise we would have to take all aspects at the same time;
all cittas can "create" a cittanimitta, but only some cittas can create a paññatti and even less cittas can see a paṭibhāganimitta
cittanimitta is not a paramattha; (:q: is it paramatthajātika or part of nāma or not classified?)
some traditions think we do not experience realities;
the blurry image of a rotating firebrand: how is it possible to see the blurry circle if we only see the present vaṇṇa? in the samudāyaggāhika vīthi puts several vaṇṇas of several Cdvīthis together
pavatta and nimitta (in the context of vipassanā)
- nimitta: objects taken by the mind; saṅkhāras
- pavatta: :q:
  - vivaṭṭana: going away, turning away, saṅkhārupekkhāñāṇa and anulomañāṇa
  - when one removes defilements, one gets out of pavatta

3.3. a

As shown above, normally when we think of something, our mind perceives a certain image-like object (However, the mind does not capture picturous object all the time). This is called the “mental content.” The correspondence of this image with the actual object determines on the fact how much we clearly remember the actual object. Even if we remember the object very well, at the very moment of thinking about it, if a change has occurred in it, we will never be able to perceive it in its actual nature. This inability to perceive the ārammaṇa in its actual appearance is not required for mentalities to cognize an object. The nature of the mind-image is greatly determined by the capacities of saññā. If said with more precision, the mind-image is made out of saññā, hence can be called saññaja. Thus, this notion can be verified within the Tradition with the information recorded in ancient Commentaries. … When many monks were sitting, having recieted a Sutta, one monk questioned others “How did the Sutta appeared to you?” One replied “It appeared to me as a river flowing from a mountain”. Another said, “To me, it appeared as a huge forest”. The next monk replied “It appeared to me as a large tree with many thick leaves and branches heavy with the load of fruits and which provides good shade”. To them, the same Sutta appeared in various ways due to the diversity of their perception.1 Diversity of perception is owing to the objects we have experienced in our lives. Based on the nature of our perception, the mind-image (or the idea about the object) changes. This is the same reason why counter sign appears in various ways to different yogis.2 What is this mind-image? Is it an ultimate reality or a concept? Mind-object does not arise with the mind. It is how saññā perceives the actual object – “Saññajanti bhāvanāsaññāya parikappitaṃ, na uppāditaṃ …”3 Then, what is the actual object of the subjective experience? Can mentalities cognize actual objects? Ārammaṇa of mentalities is the object at which mentalities are directed. It is also the same thing referred by the mind-image, hence called object of reference. The nature of the mind-image does not matter in deciding nature of the object of reference. Therefore, if mentalities are directing towards a real object, which does exist, at that time, they cognize an actual object, but in accordance with the nature of the person’s saññā. Note: Mental content (citta nimitta) is how the object of referrence (ārammaṇa) is being cognized by the consciousness. Sometimes, the mental content can be constructed by the cittuppāda. There are no humans with horns. But a person who has seen a horn of a deer and a human can merge the two objects and get the idea of a human with horns. Scientists imagine new inventions in the same manner. Types of Citta Nimittas We can find few types of citta nimittas when thoroughly studying the Theravada doctrine. 1Vsm I 277; V-a II 29; Psm-a II 99. 2Vsm I 277; V-a II 29; Psm-a II 99 3Vvm-ṭ I 218. 1 (1). Hīnattha nimitta – When a paramattha obeject (ārammaṇa) is taken not in its intrinsic nature but in another way, at that time mental content is considered a hīnattha nimitta (paññatti nimitta). The idea of self is such a mental content. (2). Paramattha nimitta – When an ultimate reality is taken as an ultimate reality, then mental content is not a paññatti or hīnattha. It can be named as a paramattha nimitta. When the citta nimitta is a paramattha nimitta the ārammaṇa of the cittuppāda is the object of reference, towards which the mind is directed. When the citta nimitta is a hīnattha nimitta, it can be said either the way – it is correct to say that the object of the cittuppāda is the object of reference and it is also correct to say that the object of the cittuppāda is the paññatti nimitta. (3). Paramattha missaka hīnattha nimitta – Sometimes, even though the citta nimitta is a hīnattha, the cittuppāda may give more attention towards the ultimate qualities of the object. Such mental content can be called as paramattha missaka hīnattha nimitta (hīnattha signs mixed with ultimate realities). For example, when practicing buddhānussati, a yogi is supposed to contemplate the Buddha, who possesses great qualities as “So, bhagavā, itipi arahaṃ, sammāsambuddho …” During this contemplation, the mind gives more attention towards the ultimate qualities of the Buddha. Therefore, mental content of such contemplation is not a mere hīnattha nimitta. However, it cannot be a pure paramattha nimitta as well as the contemplation is done focusing on the Buddha himself as “Arahaṃ, Sammāsambuddho, Vijjācaraṇasampanno …” The mental content of buddhānussati is a paramattha missaka hīnattha nimitta. However, as more attention is given to ultimate attributes of the Buddha, object of buddhānussati is considered a paramattha object in Visuddhimagga.57 When cognizing meaning of words such as “chaḷabhiñño”, which is a vijjamānena avijjamāna nāma paññatti, the mental content is a paramattha missaka hīnattha nimitta. (4). Hīnattha missaka paramattha nimitta – Sometimes the mental content can be a paramattha nimitta mixed with hīnatthas. Ultimate realities are known as substances (things with bodies) to both developed and undeveloped vipassanā yogis.58 It is also mentioned in the Paramatthadīpanī that kāyānupassanā satipaṭṭhāna is mostly a vipassanā done focusing on ultimate realities mixed with paññatti.59 (5). Dhammatā nimitta – When focusing on ultimate realities, sometimes, certain ideas may come to the mind about the laws related to those realities. At that time, the mental content is neither a paramattha nimitta nor a hīnattha nimitta. It must be considered a dhammatā nimitta. When one is cognizing the universal characteristics such as the nature of rising and falling of conditioned realities, nature of causing suffering of conditioned realities, non-selfness of conditioned realities, the mental content is a dhammatā nimitta. However, natures such as impermanence, nature of causing suffering and non selfness are considered as hīnattha in Dhamma books. Further discussion is needed on dhammatā nature of such characteristics and why they are been considered as paññattis in books.

57 Buddhaguṇānaṃ pana gambhīratāya nānappakāraguṇānussaraṇādhimuttatāya vā appanaṃ appatvā upacārappattameva jhānaṃ hoti. (Vsm. I. 206.). 58 Nimittadhammesūti samūhādighanavasena ca sakiccaparicchedatāya ca sapariggahesu khandhesu. (Ml-ṭ. I. 113.). Nimittadhammā saṅkhārā tehi sanimittā saviggahā viya upaṭṭhahantīti tesaṃ abhāvitabhāvanassa bhāvitabhāvanassa "samūhādī"tiādimāha. (Anu-ṭ. I. 121.). 59 ca upaṭṭhahanākāraṃ dassento Kāyoti pana taṃ taṃ samūhabhūtarūpadhammavasena veditabbo. Na ruppanalakkhaṇavasena. Na ca taṃ taṃ kāyabhāvena gahito taṃ taṃ rūpadhammasamūho nibbattitaparamatthadhammo nāma hoti. Paññattimissakattā. So ca tathā anupassantassa visesato oḷārikassa subhādivipallāsassa pahānāya hotīti. (Prd. 353.).

3.4. notes

at arahattmagga moment, the Buddha can be called sabbaññū, because he has removed the obstacles to sabbaññutañāṇa, though it technically arises later (at least 3 vīthis later)

4. Subjective Experience

4.1. Notes

not a term used in the theravāda literature
subject and object cannot be the same: citta cannot itself, like an eye seeing itself or a knife cutting itself (reflexive awareness, upanishads, self aware of itself, sayaṁjāta, yogacāra…ideas rejected by theravāda)
pain is experienced as it occurs, not in hindsight; example: the experience in jhāna, it cannot be reduced to the object; the experience (mainly vedanā) is experiences the bliss while in jhāna, not in hindsight; the experience is other than the object
subjective experience
:q: isn't it experiencing the object as pleasant? not the pleasantness itself
sense of familiarity with objects that were experienced mulitiple times
recalling one's own experience of something: is experienced as familiar
nāmas "feel" themselves
2 meaning of subjective experience:
- feeling itself
- one's perspective of something
episodic memory, semantic memory; memory that one had from a past experience; memory about facts
subjective experience: a basis for the self view "I saw it, I experieced it…"
counter argumenets:
- forgotten mentalities
recalling the magga process: paccavekkhaṇa vīthis
past life experience: in pubbenivāsānussati: 2 ways
- objects: recalling Bh; sometimes recalling the object, sometimes how it was experienced
- one's own experience: feel like I was there doing this and that
  - :q: isn't it just mental objects?
    - recalling jhāna: one must emerge from the jhāna, but there is an understanding of the experience one had in the jhāna
    - in jhāna: recalling the mentalities; being in the jhāna is more pleasant than recalling it;
      - yogacara: there is a reflexive awareness in the jhāna, some type of awareness (2 "awarenesses": of the object and of itself experiencing it (rejected))
      - western terms: qualia
forgotten memories
nāmas "feel" themselves; no self / rūpa to experience;
when recalling the nāmas, they feel familiar
how does the yogi in jhāna feel that attainment?
kasiṇugghāṭimākāsa is the same coming from different kasiṇas, but one can identify a subtle difference due to having come from a different object
when recalling past lives, one experiences it as familiar; one knows "one was there"

4.2. Subjective Experience in a Mental Cluster

The object of a mental cluster is the phenomenon towards which that cluster is directed. The way in which the object is taken by the cluster is called its mental content (citta nimitta/gayihākāra). The act of cognizing an object signifies that the object becomes apparent to the living being. Conventionally speaking, the mental cluster makes the object evident to the subject. In this act of cognition, the object is known, its flavour is felt, and it is recognized. These are the mental experiences one has while cognizing an object. It is possible not only to distinguish the individual functions of each mentality within a mental cluster, but also to observe the collective function of the cluster as a whole. Subjective experience is a vital aspect of our lives. It refers to the experience we have while a mental cluster (cittuppāda) collectively cognizes an object. The question arises: what sort of experience do we actually have at such a moment? In collective cognition, consciousness and its concomitants focus on an object, each performing its unique function. Here, the mentalities are regarded as the subject, and the thing cognized is the object. According to the tradition, in the act of collective cognition, the subject and object can never be the same. Thus, we arrive at the basic principle: “Consciousness can never know itself.” Elaborated further: “A given mental cluster (cittuppāda) can never take itself as the object of cognition.” Some Abhidhamma scholars illustrate this with the simile: “Just as a knife cannot cut itself, so citta cannot know itself.” Moreover, it is stated in the Visuddhimagga that a yogi who is in a jhāna does not reflect as “I am in this jhāna.” Nevertheless, one mental cluster can take as its object a different cluster that arose and ceased in the past, and sometimes even one that will arise in the future. Moreover, with supernormal powers, it is possible to know the past, present, and future mentalities of other beings as well. Therefore, in an act of collective cognition, a mental cluster knows the object it cognizes.

4.3. Present-Moment Experience of Mental States

When a certain cittuppāda arises, there is an immediate aspect of how it is felt – similar to what is called “Qualia” in Western philosophy. For instance, when one experiences pain, that pain is directly felt at the very moment it arises. Some may argue that such pain is actually felt only after several mind processes have occurred. But this position faces a difficulty. Consider the following scenario: physical pain arises, followed by javana cittas in the same mind process, and later by many cittas in subsequent mind-door processes. If the experience of pain were only felt after those subsequent cittas recalled the pain or the object of pain, this would imply that the real experience of pain is nothing more than a recollection constructed by later mind-door consciousnesses. Yet this clearly contradicts experience. There is a profound difference between the immediate, on-the-spot experience of pain and the later recollection of that pain. If mere recollection could generate the original quality of pain, then recalling a past pain would be as excruciating as the first painful moment itself. But that is not the case. Therefore, when a cittuppāda arises, it is indeed directly felt in that very moment. This point becomes even clearer in the case of jhāna. According to Theravāda, while one abides in a jhāna, only jhāna cittas arise within the same mind process; there is no opportunity for other types of consciousness to intervene during that period. How, then, does the yogi in jhāna feel the attainment? Although he does not explicitly reflect, “I am in jhāna,” the mental bliss is directly and immediately felt. The practitioner experiences the spiritual comfort on the spot while focusing on the counterpart sign (paṭibhāga nimitta). This provides solid evidence for the immediacy of subjective experience as it is directly felt, rather than mediated by recollection. This idea is clearly expressed in the Visuddhimagga under the explanation of the third jhāna. Idāni sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedetīti ettha kiñcāpi tatiyajjhānasamaṅgino sukhapaṭisaṃvedanābhogo natthi. (though one who has 3 jhana there is no ābhoga, contemplation, "i am feeling the happiness") Evaṃ santepi yasmā tassa nāmakāyena sampayuttaṃ sukhaṃ (even though that is, his jhana is blissful). Yaṃ vā taṃ nāmakāyasampayuttaṃ sukhaṃ, taṃsamuṭṭhānenassa yasmā atipaṇītena rūpena rūpakāyo phuṭo (body is pervaded by the pleasant cittajarupas produced by that happiness), yassa phuṭattā jhānā vuṭṭhitopi sukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedeyya (emerging, one can contemplate "i am feeling this bodily bliss") Tasmā etamatthaṃ dassento sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedetīti āha.1

The Visuhddhimagg Ṭīkā further explains this notion saying that the Visuddhimagga cleary explains how a yogi while being in the third jhāna experiences the bliss without a contemplation as “I experience the bliss.” Futehr, after the yogi has emerged from the jhāna, the he experiences the physical bliss together with the contemplation as “I experience the bliss.”

Aparo nayo – sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedetīti ettha kathamābhogena vinā sukhapaṭisaṃvedanāti codanāyaṃ "kiñcāpi…pe… evaṃ santepī"ti. Yasmā tassa nāmakāyena sampayuttaṃ sukhaṃ, tasmā sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedetīti yojanā. Idāni sahāpi ābhogena sukhapaṭisaṃvedanaṃ dassetuṃ "yaṃ vā ta"ntiādi vuttaṃ.2

how can one feel the bliss without the contemplation that "i am feeling it"? though one doesn't contemplate in this way, one expreiences it

notes:

kayena:
- mental body namakaya
- physical body rupakaya
namakaya : there is no contemplation in the jhāna
rupakaya: there is contemplation out of the jhāna (after emerging one feels the bodily feeling with kayaviññāṇa)
sukhavihāri: he abides with happiness (during the experience of jhāna)
upekkhika sukha: without pīti (3rd jhāna)
the familiarity one experiences when recollecting past namas shows that namas feel themselves when they occur
cittajarupas produced by the jhānacittas are not experienced, since they pass away when one emerge; like when emerging from the water and feeling the breeze
asaññasattas may be seen as being free from suffering; avedayita suffering more or less, still in the vedayita but not felt directly (not like avedayita in the sense of cessation of suffering); sukha in jhāna not felt directly in the jhāna (bodily), but it is still bodily bliss; bliss here refers
free from suffering; experiencing it; bliss happening but not experienced directly

4.4. Present-Moment Experience and the Familiarity of the Experience

When a certain cittuppāda or mental state is experienced in a particular manner, and later recalled, we feel a sense of familiarity with that experience as, “I have experienced it.” Even if this idea is not explicitly brought to mind when recalling a past experience, the familiarity is still clearly felt. How can this be possible?

The reason for this familiarity lies in the way mental states are felt at the moment of experience. Mental states are felt as they exist in the present moment.

Here, the problem arises: who is receiving this experience? According to Theravāda, there is no person or entity that receives the experience. Only mind and matter exist, and there is no self apart from these two phenomena. Furthermore, mind and matter themselves are not the self and the matter does not feel anything. If this is the case, how can familiarity arise when recalling such mental experiences? When we encounter a familiar external object, perception (saññā) recognizes it based on previous perceptions, and we feel a sense of familiarity with that object. The reason for this familiarity is that the object has been experienced before – cognized by consciousness in the past. Similarly, when we experience familiarity while recalling past mental states, that familiarity is due to having had that experience previously. In this case, what is recognized is not an external object but a subjective experience. And the experience is not encountering an external object but having the subjective experience itself.

Because familiarity presupposes at least a second encounter with the same experience, and since there is no self that received that experience and retained it, it must be concluded that the mental states themselves are experiencing at the moment of their existence. The experience of the mental states is felt by themselves. As a result, when those mental states are recalled, they are felt as familiar and not entirely new.

1Vsm. I. 158. 2Vsm-ṭ. II. 188.

vedanta: self (atman, brahman) "receives" the experience and is apart from mind and matter
- upanisha
- brahmasutra
- bhagavagīta
bhante: this should be taught in the beginning of abhidhamma
west: qualia does not occur any time; east: even while thinking, calculating, etc. there is such qualia

4.5. Diagram of Recollection

The functioning of mentalities in recalling a past experience can be illustrated as follows.

Mental-Cluster (S1) Mental-Cluster (S2) Initial Cognition Recalling Object (O1) Object (O2) [Mental-Cluster (S1) Which Cognized Object (O1)]

First, we cognize a particular object. In the initial cognition, the subject is the Mental-Cluster (S1), and the cognized entity is the Object (O1). Later, when we recall the event, the Mental-Cluster (S2) recalls the earlier Mental-Cluster (S1). At that moment, the object (O2) of S2 is S1 itself, which had originally cognized O1. Because S1 not only knew O1 but also felt itself in its cognition, when S2 recalls S1, we experience a sense of familiarity with the original act of cognition. We don’t feel S1 as an alien object. This gives rise to the recognition: “I cognized that object (O1).” Thus, when S1 is recalled by S2, four kinds of experiences are involved: (1). We recall the act of cognition performed by S1 (S1 itself becomes the object O2). (2). We recall the object cognized by S1, namely O1. (3). We become aware of S1 experiencing itself (Qualia of S1). (4). S2 experiences its own act of cognition in the present (Qualia of S2).

4.6. Episodic Memory vs. Semantic Memory

This familiarity distinguishes episodic memory from mere semantic memory. For instance, when we read about Alexander the Great’s conquests from Macedonia to the Indus River, this remains mere information. It appears in memory as knowledge of facts but not as lived experience. In contrast, if we witness a car accident and later recall it, we not only recall the event but also our own presence as witness. We feel, “I saw it myself.” Thus, the difference between episodic memory and semantic memory lies in the phenomenon of how mental states are felt at that moment of experience.

4.7. note: yogacara: svasaṁvedaṇa: feeling itself

theravada is not svasamdevana

4.8. Contribution to Self-View

Subjective experience is the primary basis for the idea of “I.” Because mental clusters feel themselves while cognizing objects, we experience thoughts such as “I am watching” or “I am knowing.” Among the realities contributing to subjective experience, vedanā (feeling) and saññā (recognition) play leading roles in the arising of self-view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) and self-conceit (asmimāna): (1). Vedanā tastes the flavour of the object. Due to the way how feeling is felt, feeling generates the sense of “I am feeling” or “I am with feeling.” In the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha pointed out that it is illogical to regard rūpa – which is not associated with feeling – as “I.”3 What he has suggested is that it is not logical to consider something without subjective experience as the self. (2). Saññā recognizes the unique attributes of objects. When refined, it enables one to discern even subtle differences. Accumulated recognition leads to esteem, as when a person is regarded as learned or knowledgeable. This feeds both self-view and conceit. As mentalities feel themselves at the moment, perception feeds the notions such as “I am recognizing,” “I am knowledgeable,” or “I have much knowledge.” In truth, all mental factors – citta, cetanā, vitakka, vicāra, and others – contribute in varying degrees to self-view, because each feels its own existence.

4.9. Objections Against the Theory and Replies

Following objections can be raised against this suggested theory by some critics.

4.9.1. Objection 1

Familiarity by recall: the sense of familiarity / subjectivity arises because the present recalling consciousness reconstructs the past event and projects the sense that “I was there.”

Reply [

if so, the experience should initially appear unfamiliar, becoming familiar only after repeated recall; however, it is often immediate such as when one attains maggaphala and reflects "I have attained this magga and phala"
Objective familiarity differs from subjective familiarity:
- We can become familiar with external objects, but such familiarity never produces the sense of “I experienced it.” Only subjective familiarity – rooted in the way the mentalities are felt at the moment of their existence – can account for this.

]

4.9.2. Objection 2:

a rapid succession of saññā quickly produces a sense of familiarity

Reply [ If so, no object in the world would ever be unfamiliar to us. ]

4.9.3. Objection 3

It is the nature of mentalities such as saññā to recognize past mentalities with the sense of familiarity, even if they were not felt by themselves at the moment of their experience.

Reply [ This would lead to further complications. According to this objection, mentalities do not feel themselves. But we surely get the sense of familiarity in experience “as we experienced that object/incident at that very moment.” We have a sense of memory of how the feelings and emotions were felt at that time. We can recall how we were experiencing it then. If the mental cluster did not feel itself, that idea as “I experienced this at that moment” is an illusion.

However, this sense of subjective experience is felt even in wisdom of the highest levels such as paccavekkhaṇa ñāṇa and pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa. A noble being, immediately after attaining the path and fruition in the same mind process, recalls his path and fruition in the subsequent vīthis: “I attained this path” and “I attained this fruition.” He feels how magga and phala arose in him and all the subjective experiences associated with that attainment.4 If the magga and phala cittas did not feel themselves, paccavekkhaṇa vīthis must be fabricating an illusory experience which did not occur in reality. This contradicts the Theravāda doctrine. Moreover, when recalling past lives with the pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa, the yogi knows with certainty and familiarity that he had those experiences in the past. Even the Buddha would experience that same feeling. If there was no such subjective experience in the very first place, the sense of familiarity would be an illusory construction of the supernatural wisdom itself, a notion not compatible with the Theravāda doctrine. ]

4.9.4. Objection 4

Sometimes, familiarity can be illusory, suggesting that saññā or the cittuppāda is capable of fabricating first-personal (subjective) feel even without self feeling in a past citta. Reply 4 Yes, it is true that there are false memories. We need to see the two facets of a false memory: the mental content and the subjective experience. It is possible that the mental content (citta nimitta) can be fabricated by the mind as in the case of illusions. But the sense of familiarity arises from the subjective experiences one had while various cittas arose in the past; the feeling of familiarity arises from real cognitive traces laid down by past cittas – not from thin air. A subjective experience cannot be fabricated ex nihilo; the subjective experience of false memories are constructed by drawing upon other real subjective experiences that have occurred in different cittas. The sense of familiarity is present because those cittas which served as the basis for the subjective experience of false memory were indeed felt when they first arose. So, it could be that the mental content of a false memory is a mental fabrication, while its subjective experience is no

4 Sotāpannassa hi maggavīthiyaṃ sotāpattiphalapariyosāne cittaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ otarati, tato bhavaṅgaṃ upacchinditvā maggapaccavekkhaṇatthāya manodvārāvajjanaṃ uppajjati, tasmiṃ niruddhe paṭipāṭiyā satta maggapaccavekkhaṇajavanānīti. Puna bhavaṅgaṃ otaritvā teneva nayena phalādīnaṃ paccavekkhaṇatthāya āvajjanādīni uppajjanti. Yesaṃ uppattiyā esa maggaṃ paccavekkhati, phalaṃ paccavekkhati, pahīnakilese paccavekkhati, avasiṭṭhakilese paccavekkhati, nibbānaṃ paccavekkhati. So hi "iminā vatāhaṃ maggena āgato"ti maggaṃ paccavekkhati, tato "ayaṃ me ānisaṃso laddho"ti phalaṃ paccavekkhati, tato "ime nāma me kilesā pahīnā"ti pahīnakilese paccavekkhati, tato "ime nāma me kilesā avasiṭṭhā"ti uparimaggavajjhe kilese paccavekkhati, avasāne "ayaṃ me dhammo ārammaṇato paṭiladdho"ti amataṃ nibbānaṃ paccavekkhati. (Psm-a. I. 28.).

Objection 5 (Objection from Subtle and Forgotten Mental States) It is also recognized in Theravāda that certain subtle cittas cannot be recalled through ordinary memory, such as the bhavaṅga citta and the cittas of past lives. In addition, many memories are forgotten. If all cittas felt themselves, then why are these cittas not easily recalled? Why can we not access the experience of how-it-is-felt of bhavaṅga cittas, past-life cittas, or the forgotten experiences of this life? Reply 5 Bhavaṅga cittas cannot ordinarily be recalled because of their extreme subtlety, while past-life cittas are inaccessible due to the break between the cuti citta of the former life and the paṭisandhi citta of the present life. Nevertheless, when the mind is developed to the level of pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa, as described in the Visuddhimagga, it becomes possible to recall bhavaṅga cittas, the paṭisandhi citta, the cuti citta, and indeed the cittas of past lives. At that point, the yogi directly knows them and recollects them with clarity. A yogi who has attained pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa may even recall long-forgotten or extremely subtle experiences of the present life. Whenever a yogi is recalling the forgotten memories or bhavaṅga cittas or the consciousnesses of past existences, he recalls them with the distinct sense of familiarity: “I saw this; I experienced that.” Therefore, the inability to recall certain cittas under ordinary conditions, due to their subtlety or the limitations of memory, does not undermine the principle that each citta had its own subjective experience.

4.10. Reflexive Awareness and the Phenomenon of How-It-Is-Felt at the Present

Moment One might argue that the above theory leads to the idea of reflexive awareness – consciousness being aware of itself. Actually, what has been discussed above is subjective experience, not reflexive awareness. Subjective experience is how a certain mental state is felt at the moment of its existence. It is similar to Qualia. In Theravāda, unlike in the philosophy of mind as held by most philosophers, every mental state, including the act of thinking, is associated with Qualia. Since, according to Theravāda, there is no Self other than the mentalities (and matter), the experience is felt by the mentalities themselves. On the other hand, reflexive awareness suggests that consciousness is aware of itself while being aware of the object it cognizes. Theravāda strongly denies this standpoint, stating that just as a knife cannot cut itself, no citta can know itself. Therefore, this theory does not advocate reflexive awareness but rather explains the subjective experience of mentalities – of how they are felt at the moment of their existence.

4.11. Notes

ajjhāsaya = adhimutti: disposition
living together; associating a lot in this life;
- yasodhara, in a past life, was very arrogant and did not accept any men, but just by hearing the bodhisatta's steps, she submitted
- milinda king new who nāgasena was without anyone telling him
- many factors influence the familiarity between people
- jayabhūmi: place where one attains enlightenment

Author: Brazil Ariyañāṇa Bhikkhu

Created: 2026-09-12 Sat 15:31

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Abhidhamma (Semester VI)